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It is well-documented that explicit memory (e.g., recognition) declines with age. In
contrast, many argue that implicit memory (e.g., priming) is preserved in healthy aging.
For example, priming on tasks such as perceptual identification is often not statistically
different in groups of young and older adults. Such observations are commonly taken
as evidence for distinct explicit and implicit learning/memory systems. In this article we
discuss several lines of evidence that challenge this view. We describe how patterns
of differential age-related decline may arise from differences in the ways in which the
two forms of memory are commonly measured, and review recent research suggesting
that under improved measurement methods, implicit memory is not age-invariant. Formal
computational models are of considerable utility in revealing the nature of underlying
systems. We report the results of applying single and multiple-systems models to data
on age effects in implicit and explicit memory. Model comparison clearly favors the
single-system view. Implications for the memory systems debate are discussed.
Keywords: aging, implicit memory, priming, recognition, models of memory
With the age distribution of the global population steadily
increasing, there is great importance in studying and understand-
ing changes in learning and memory in later adulthood. As well
as providing a clearer picture of how these functions are affected
by cognitive decline, research in this area can shed considerable
light on the underlying structure of memory. This has substan-
tial and wide-reaching implications. It is now well-established
that explicit memory, the conscious experience of remembering
previously learned information, declines with age and moreover
the rate of decline is an important predictor of dementia (Wilson
et al., 2011). In contrast, there have been numerous reports over
the last few decades of age-invariant implicit memory in healthy
subjects. Implicit memory, it is often argued, occurs outside of
awareness, and is evident when prior experiences affect (e.g.,
facilitate) performance on tasks that do not require conscious
recollection of those experiences (Schacter, 1987). Reports of dif-
ferential effects of age on explicit and implicit memory have led
many to conclude that the two are driven by functionally distinct
memory systems. If true, then preservation of implicit memory
might open up significant opportunities to remediate cogni-
tive decline, aiding such important real-life demands as acquir-
ing face-name pairs or learning medication routines. Moreover,
because it has been suggested that implicit memory is preserved
in healthy older individuals but not those with early Alzheimer’s
Disease, well-designed implicit tasks might provide a useful diag-
nostic tool for pathological aging (see Fleischman, 2007). In this
article we review observations that have led researchers to con-
clude that implicit memory is preserved with age. We discuss
various issues that undermine this interpretation, as well as the
notion that the two forms of memory are controlled by separate
systems.
EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT MEMORY IN NORMAL AGING
Perhaps the best documented cognitive feature of growing older
is that it is associated with a decline in the capacity to consciously
learn and remember. Healthy older individuals often experience
difficulties in remembering recently learned information, and
typically perform worse than their younger counterparts on labo-
ratory tests of explicit memory (reviewed inMitchell, 1989; Light,
1991; Kausler, 1994). Such tests instruct participants to deliber-
ately attempt to recall or recognize specific information from a
prior episode. For example, in a recognition task, participants
study a series of stimuli such as pictures or words and are later
asked to discriminate between previously studied (old) and new
items.
Explicit memory is thought to decline steadily throughout late
adulthood. A study by Fleischman et al. (2004) reported progres-
sive decline in individuals with a mean age of 78.6 years over
a 4-year period on a battery of explicit tests involving immedi-
ate and delayed recall and recognition of stories, numbers, and
words (see also Hultsch et al., 1992; Christensen et al., 1997;
Davis et al., 2001). There is also an abundance of evidence from
cross-sectional studies that individuals over the age of 60 perform
significantly worse than individuals in their twenties on tests of
recall and recognition (reviewed in Mitchell, 1989; Light, 1991).
Given the clear decline in explicit memory with age, there has
been a profound interest over the past few decades in establish-
ing whether implicit memory also declines. Implicit memory is
evident when previously learned information affects (e.g., facil-
itates) performance on tasks that do not require the individual
to consciously recollect the information. Previously encountered
stimuli have a processing advantage over stimuli that were not
previously encountered, a phenomenon known as repetition
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priming (henceforth priming). For example, seeing the word
“cake” increases the likelihood that it will later be used to solve
the word-fragment “c__e” even though there are several possi-
ble solutions. This type of word-completion task is commonly
used in the laboratory to measure priming (e.g., Park and Shaw,
1992; Small et al., 1995; Spaan and Raaijmakers, 2011), and is usu-
ally disguised as an unrelated task. That is, following an initial
phase in which a series of words are studied, participants are sub-
sequently asked to complete word-fragments or stems with the
first word that comes to mind, and no reference is made to the
prior study phase. Perceptual identification is another commonly
employed task that is used to compare the performance of dif-
ferent age groups (e.g., Fleischman and Gabrieli, 1998; Buchner
and Wippich, 2000; Light et al., 2000; Mitchell and Bruss, 2003).
Here, following a seemingly unrelated task in which a series of
stimuli (usually pictures or words) are viewed, old and new items
are presented either very briefly or in a degraded form, and par-
ticipants are simply asked to identify them. Priming is revealed in
the speeded or more accurate identification of old relative to new
items.
The majority of studies that have investigated priming in nor-
mal aging have reported that it does not decline significantly
(reviewed in Mitchell, 1989; Fleischman and Gabrieli, 1998;
Fleischman, 2007). Several longitudinal studies have demon-
strated stable priming with advancing age despite substantial
declines in explicit memory (Hultsch et al., 1992; Christensen
et al., 1997; Davis et al., 2001; Fleischman et al., 2004). Moreover,
many cross-sectional studies employing a range of different tasks
have reported non-significantly different priming between groups
of young and older adults (e.g., Mitchell et al., 1990; Light et al.,
1992; Park and Shaw, 1992; Schacter et al., 1992; Mitchell and
Bruss, 2003; Wiggs et al., 2006; Soldan et al., 2009; Spaan and
Raaijmakers, 2011).
The apparent sparing of implicit memory (priming) with age
in the face of a clear decline in explicit memory has been a
highly influential observation in the memory systems debate. It
has been heavily cited in the literature as providing evidence
that the two forms of memory are qualitatively distinct and
driven by functionally independent cognitive and neural systems
(e.g., Schacter, 1987; Tulving and Schacter, 1990; Schacter and
Tulving, 1994; Squire, 1994, 2004, 2009; Gabrieli, 1998, 1999).
Supporters of this multiple-systems perspective have argued that
the decline in explicit but not implicit memory demonstrates that
an explicit system succumbs to natural age-related changes in
the brain, while an implicit system does not. There are, however,
salient problems with the interpretation that implicit memory is
completely spared with age.
IMPLICIT MEMORY: SPARED OR IMPAIRED IN NORMAL
AGING?
The idea that implicit memory remains stable as we age has
come to be widely accepted, yet not all studies demonstrate
preserved priming in older individuals. There are cases in the lit-
erature in which priming in older adults is significantly reduced
in comparison to that in young adults (e.g., Chiarello and Hoyer,
1988; Abbenhuis et al., 1990; Davis et al., 1990; Hultsch et al.,
1991; Ward et al., 2013). Moreover, in published studies that
claim to have revealed preserved priming in older individuals,
performance has most often been numerically reduced in these
individuals compared to the young (see Fleischman and Gabrieli,
1998). Could there be a genuine decline in priming with age that
often goes undetected? If the effect is very small, then because the
majority of studies have used relatively small sample sizes, the
answer to this question may be yes. Statistical power to detect
small but real age effects may have been too low in many stud-
ies (a detailed discussion of this issue is provided in Mitchell
and Bruss, 2003). La Voie and Light (1994) conducted an exten-
sive meta-analysis, which uncovered a small but significant age
effect on priming, calling into question the soundness of draw-
ing a distinction between explicit and implicit memory systems. A
decline in both forms ofmemory with age could point to a general
impairment of a unitary memory system.
If both explicit and implicit forms of memory decline with
age, why is the effect so much smaller on measures of implicit
memory, to the extent that changes are difficult to detect statisti-
cally? One issue is that implicit tasks often have lower reliability
than explicit tasks (see Buchner and Wippich, 2000; LeBel and
Paunonen, 2011; Ward et al., 2013). To illustrate this, consider
the comparison that is frequently made between performance on
recognition and word-completion tasks. In a recognition task the
goal to discriminate old from new items is relatively rigid, whereas
the instructions in word-completion tasks—to complete stems
or fragments with the first word that comes to mind—allow a
considerable amount of flexibility in performance strategy. Put
differently, it is clear to the individual that whichever strategy
maximizes discrimination accuracy in recognition is better than
all other strategies; in word-completion, by contrast, any strategy
which successfully generates completions is as good as any other.
Buchner and Wippich (2000) argued that this leads to high lev-
els of response variability (noise) in implicit memory tasks, and
they showed empirically that word-stem completion is a statisti-
cally less reliable task than recognition. More recently, Ward et al.
(2013) demonstrated that the continuous identification (CID)
task (described later) also has lower reliability than recognition.
The corollary is that tasks with low reliability are unlikely to detect
small differences in performance as a function of age. Indeed,
Buchner and Wippich demonstrated how differences in measure
reliability can explain the age differential pattern of performance
on recognition and word-completion tasks. Conversely, Salthouse
et al. (1999) reported an instance in which an implicit learning
task (serial reaction time) had acceptable reliability levels, and was
associated with a small but significant age effect.
There are several other measurement issues that could con-
tribute toward differential age effects on explicit and implicit
tasks. Typically the tasks differ in several characteristics, such as
the available retrieval cues, the processing demands, and the type
of response required, and different tasks are likely to be more or
less sensitive to aging depending on their specific requirements
and characteristics. For example, it is thought that conceptual
processing is affected by age to a greater extent than perceptual
processing (Jelicic et al., 1996), and whereas many explicit tasks
require conceptual processing (e.g., cued recall), most implicit
tasks are perceptual in nature (e.g., word-fragment completion,
perceptual identification). Furthermore, there is evidence that
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 639 | 2
Ward et al. Implicit memory in normal aging
production processes tend to diminish with age, while identifi-
cation processes are relatively spared (e.g., Rybash, 1996), so this
may explain why there are larger age effects on explicit tasks such
as free recall in comparison to implicit tasks involving simple
identification. Another important issue is that indices of explicit
and implicit memory have traditionally been captured in separate
experimental phases. That is, priming for a subset of previously
studied items is usually measured prior to measuring explicit
memory for another subset of items (e.g., Mitchell and Bruss,
2003), so it is perhaps not surprising that memory in the latter
is weaker, especially in older individuals, due to the longer delay
involved (evidence suggests that explicit memory declines rapidly
over delays, e.g., Mitchell et al., 1990). Furthermore, even if tasks
with comparable characteristics are used, scores may dissociate
when they are presented in separate experimental phases because
participants may adopt different response strategies or levels of
motivation in the two.
From the evidence reviewed above, the following is clear: First,
the interpretation that implicit memory is preserved with age
is questionable. Second, there are several reasons why outcomes
on explicit and implicit memory tests may differ as a function
of age, even if the two tap the same underlying memory sys-
tem. Thus, age-related dissociations between explicit and implicit
memory do not necessarily constitute evidence formultiplemem-
ory systems. This general viewpoint is not new (see Buchner and
Wippich, 2000; Dunn, 2003; Berry et al., 2006, 2008a,b; Nosofsky
et al., 2012; Ward et al., 2013), but until recently there have been
few attempts to overcome these key measurement issues. This was
the main goal in the study by Ward et al. (2013). Healthy young
and older adults studied pictures of everyday objects before per-
forming a continuous identification with recognition (CID-R)
task. This task captures a measure of recognition and priming
for each item concurrently, ensuring that samples of memory
are as comparable as possible. In the task, old and new pictures
gradually clarified from a background mask and participants
were asked to identify the item as quickly as possible (yielding
a priming measure) before indicating whether they believed the
item had been previously studied (yielding a recognition mea-
sure). Obtaining a clear dissociation using this method would
constitute more compelling evidence for multiple memory sys-
tems relative to when items are judged on two separate occasions
(i.e., in separate experimental phases). Two experiments demon-
strated significantly weaker recognition memory in older relative
to young adults, and there was a clear numerical reduction in
priming with age. Importantly, the priming task was found to
be objectively less reliable than the recognition task, and the
age difference in priming became significant when the data were
pooled across experiments to increase power. These findings are
consistent with the single-system view.
Some have argued that reduced priming in older compared
to young individuals is due to explicit contamination. That is, if
participants notice during an implicit test that some items were
previously studied (termed test awareness), they may voluntar-
ily attempt to use an explicit processing strategy. For example,
in a word-completion task, instead of completing stems or frag-
ments with words that first come to mind, participants may try
to explicitly recall items from the prior study phase (discussed in
Spaan and Raaijmakers, 2011). Similarly, in a perceptual iden-
tification task, participants may try to recall the items shown
in the study episode in an attempt to aid their identifications.
The use of such a strategy could conceivably lead to an age
difference in performance, because it is likely to be more benefi-
cial to young individuals due to their superior explicit memory.
The evidence for this argument, however, is mixed. Russo and
Parkin (1993) found an age difference in priming on a frag-
mented picture completion task, but the effect disappeared when
available explicit memory was equated between groups by ask-
ing young individuals to perform a dual task at study. Geraci
and Barnhardt (2010) found greater levels of test awareness and
priming in young relative to older adults on word-stem comple-
tion and category production tasks, and a greater relationship
between the two, which was taken as evidence that test aware-
ness mediates age effects in priming. Moreover, Park and Shaw
(1992) demonstrated a small, non-significant age difference in
priming on a word-stem completion task, but means were iden-
tical for young and older participants who were test unaware
(0.08 proportion priming). On the other hand, however, prim-
ing effects in other studies have been largely unaffected by test
awareness. For example, in Ward et al.’s (2013) study the numer-
ical age difference in priming persisted when the data of aware
participants were removed (mean proportions of 0.13 and 0.08
for young and older adults, respectively) (see also Light et al.,
2000).
Ward et al. (2013) examined in detail the effect of explicit pro-
cessing in the CID (continuous identification) task, and found
no evidence that this affects the magnitude of priming obtained
(Experiments 3A–C). Manipulations were introduced to facilitate
successful explicit processing, including informing participants in
advance which items were old and new, and varying the ratio of
old to new test trials (in order to manipulate the likelihood that
participants would become test aware—there is a greater likeli-
hood that participants will become aware when there is a high
number of old relative to new test trials). Even when participants
received optimal explicit information, priming in young indi-
viduals did not differ from that in participants who received no
explicit information and did not become test aware (Experiments
3A,B). Moreover, performance was not worsened in young indi-
viduals when explicit processing was made disadvantageous by
providing incorrect “old/new” test cues (Experiment 3C). This
suggests that priming in this task is not affected by optimal or
adverse explicit processing, and thus the reliable age difference
in priming is unlikely to have been driven by the differential use
of an explicit processing strategy by young and older adults. Of
course, caution must be taken when interpreting null results. An
analysis revealed that Experiment 3A with 107 participants had
adequate power to detect a relatively small effect of informing
participants, if it had existed (power of 0.82 to detect an effect
size of 0.28). The true numerical effect size was tiny (0.03), thus,
if real, more than 7000 participants would have been needed to
detect the effect statistically. Moreover, in Experiment 3B, the
small numerical priming trend was in the opposite direction to
that which would be expected if explicit processing were able
to boost priming (i.e., greater priming in uninformed relative to
informed conditions).
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To summarize this section, it appears that both explicit and
implicit memory decline with age, although the reduction in
priming is usually much smaller than that in recognition, such
that high statistical power is needed in order to detect it. Although
many studies have reported a non-significant age difference in
priming, the power issue combined with evidence that implicit
tasks often have low reliability weakens the common claim that
implicit memory is completely unaffected by aging. For this rea-
son, these sorts of observations should not be taken as support
for the view that explicit and implicit memory are driven by inde-
pendent memory systems. A range of other studies, including the
recent investigation by Ward et al. (2013) which aimed to over-
come some critical measurement issues, suggest that there is a
general memory decline that is simply picked up more easily on
explicit tasks. This supports the view that a single system drives
both explicit and implicit memory phenomena.
In the next section we describe how formal computational
models have allowed more insight into the problem, and we dis-
cuss new evidence in relation to the application of such models to
the data of Ward et al. (2013).
EVIDENCE FROM FORMAL SINGLE AND MULTIPLE SYSTEMS
MODELS
Computational models can offer considerable theoretical insights
into empirical dissociations, as simulations can provide an
explicit (in the sense of precise and detailed) account of the cog-
nitive mechanisms underlying task performance. Single-system
models have successfully reproduced several dissociations that
have previously been taken as support for multiple memory sys-
tems (e.g., Nosofsky and Zaki, 1998; Kinder and Shanks, 2001,
2003; Shanks and Perruchet, 2002; Shanks et al., 2003; Berry et al.,
2006, 2008a,b, 2010, 2012; Newell and Dunn, 2008; Newell et al.,
2010; Dunn et al., 2012; Nosofsky et al., 2012). The Berry et al. sin-
gle system model assumes that a single memory signal drives
performance on explicit and implicit tasks, but that there are in
addition independent sources of random noise contributing to
performance on these tasks. It assumes that the variance of the
noise is typically greater in the implicit task, which is consis-
tent with observations that these tasks have lower reliability than
explicit tasks. Ward et al. (2013) previously showed that a larger
age difference in recognition than priming could be explained
well by this single-system model. A reduction in the strength of
the signal gave rise to the pattern of performance seen in aging.
However, rather than simply showing that this single-system
model can provide a good fit to the data, a crucial test is to
determine whether it provides a better account of the data than
multiple-systems models. Here we investigate this by formally
comparing the fits of the single-system (SS) model and multiple-
systems versions of the model to the data of Ward et al. (2013). To
our knowledge this is the first attempt to formally fit multiple-
systems models to empirical aging data. We first describe the
models before explaining the fitting process and the findings.
In the SS model, it is assumed that every item at test is asso-
ciated with a memory strength of evidence value, f, which is a
normally distributed, random variable with meanμ and standard
deviation σf (i.e., f ∼ N(μ, σf )). Because old items are previously
studied, the mean f of old items (μold) is greater than that of new
items (μnew, set to equal zero). In order to derive a recognition
judgment for the item, its value of f is combined with a value
of noise, er, which is specific to the recognition task, giving the
recognition strength variable Jr:
Jr = f + er (1)
where er is another normally distributed random variable with
a mean equal to zero and standard deviation σr (er ∼ N(0,
σr)). er is uncorrelated with f, and represents the influence of
non-memorial factors upon task performance (e.g., trial-to-trial
variability in the placement of a decision criterion for making an
“old” judgment). If Jr exceeds a threshold, C, then the item will
be judged old, or else it will be judged new. Thus, when μold is
greater than μnew, a greater proportion of old than new items will
tend to have values of Jr that exceed C; hence old items will be
judged old more often than new ones.
Each item’s value of f is also used to derive its identification
RT (the basis of the priming measure). It is assumed that RT is a
decreasing function of f such that greater values of f will tend to
produce shorter identification RTs:
RT = b − sf + ep (2)
where b represents the identification RT intercept (and is the
expected RT of new items), and s represents the rate of change
in RT with f. Both s and b serve to scale the identification RT. ep is
another source of noise, which is also a normally distributed, ran-
dom variable (ep ∼ N(0, σp)), is uncorrelated with er and f, and
represents the influence of non-memorial factors upon perfor-
mance in the identification task (e.g., the influence of extraneous
perceptual factors upon identification, such as the amount of per-
ceptual information available from the stimuli when presented at
test; see Ostergaard, 1998). Thus, when μold is greater than μnew,
old items will tend to have shorter identification RTs than new
items (i.e., there will be a priming effect).
Because each item’s recognition judgment and identification
RT are derived from the same value of f in the SS model, it
predicts that there will be associations between the recognition
judgment and the identification RT. Greater values of f will tend
to lead to a greater likelihood of an old judgment and also a
relatively short identification RT. Thus, within item types, one
prediction of the SS model is that there will be fluency effects, in
other words that items judged old will tend to have shorter iden-
tification RTs than items judged new [i.e., RT(hit) < RT(miss)
and RT(false alarm) < RT(correct rejection), where a hit is an
old judgment to an old item, a miss is a new judgment to an old
item, a false alarm is an old judgment to a new item, and a cor-
rect rejection is a new judgment to a new item] (Prediction 1). A
second prediction concerns the relative magnitudes of the prim-
ing effect across all items and the priming effect for items judged
new. The latter priming effect is shown if the identification RTs
for old items not recognized (misses) are shorter than the iden-
tification RTs for new items judged new (correct rejections), and
indicates that a priming effect is occurring even in the absence
of overt recognition. In the model, the Jr values of misses will
tend to be larger than those of correct rejections (because misses
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are old items), but the difference in Jr between all old and new
items will tend to be greater than the difference in Jr to misses
and correct rejections because all of the Jr values for misses and
correct rejections are below C. Differences in Jr tend to reflect dif-
ferences in identification RTs. Thus, the priming effect across all
items [i.e., RT(new) − RT(old)] will tend to be greater than the
priming effect for items judged new [i.e., RT(correct rejection −
RT(miss)] (Prediction 2).
In the multiple-systems 1 (MS1) and multiple-systems 2
(MS2) models (see Berry et al., 2012), recognition judgments
and identification RTs are derived in the same manner described
above, except that in order to represent the multiple memory
systems proposal that the sources of memory driving recogni-
tion and priming are distinct, one “explicit” source of memory
strength, fr, is used to derive Jr, and a separate “implicit” source
of strength, fp, is used to derive the RT, where fr ∼ N(μr, σf ),
and fp ∼ N(μp, σf ). Importantly, μr|old and μp|old in the MS1
and MS2 models are free to vary independently of one another.
This enables these models to reproduce findings of functional
independence, that is, independent variables (e.g., aging) can,
in principle, selectively affect the overall strength in one of the
memory systems (i.e., selectively affect μr|old or μp|old).
In the MS1 model, an extra assumption is that the
explicit and implicit strengths of a given item are uncorrelated
[i.e., r(fr, fp) = 0], which represents a relatively strong interpre-
tation of the claim that explicit and implicit memory systems are
independent. This captures the claim that recognition and prim-
ing performance across items is completely uncorrelated (i.e.,
Tulving et al., 1982). In the MS2 model, the fp and fr signals
of a given item may be correlated, with value w. This corre-
lation could arise, for example, as a result of distinctiveness: a
particularly distinctive item at study may be encoded strongly
into both the explicit and implicit memory systems (and hence
both fp and fr for that item will be relatively high). The MS2
model therefore offers a weaker interpretation of the idea that
explicit and implicit memory systems are independent: although
independent variables may selectively affect μr and μp (i.e., the
systems are functionally independent), there may be associations
between recognition judgments and identification RTs too. Thus,
the MS2 model is more flexible than the SS and MS1 models. In
fact, both the SS and MS1 models are special cases of the MS2
model: When w = 1 and μr = μp, the MS2 model is equivalent
to the SS model; when w = 0, the MS2 model is equivalent to the
MS1 model.
RESULTS: FITTING THE MODELS TO THE DATA OF WARD
ET AL. (2013)
The models were fit to the data of Ward et al. (2013),
Experiment 1. The behavioral procedure and findings were as
follows: Healthy young and older adults studied two sets of
30 pictures of everyday objects, separated by a 60min delay.
Immediately following the second study phase, participants per-
formed a CID-R task, which contained the 60 previously studied
items (immediate and delayed), as well as an equal number of new
items. The delay was included to reduce the strength of mem-
ory for a subset of items as much as possible. In the test, old
and new pictures gradually clarified from a background mask
and participants were asked to identify the item as quickly as
possible (priming index) before deciding whether it was presented
in either of the earlier study phases (recognition judgment). There
were significant main effects of age and delay on recognition (d′,
see Figure 1), with performance being superior for young rela-
tive to older adults at both retention intervals. Recognition was
significantly reduced for items studied 60min prior to testing, rel-
ative to those studied immediately before. Priming was calculated
for each individual as the difference between the median iden-
tification RT for old (immediate and delayed) and new items,
in proportion to their baseline (new item) RT [i.e., (RTnew −
RTold[immediate or delayed])/RTnew; Figure 2]. Priming was
numerically reduced in older compared to young individuals,
FIGURE 1 | Recognition performance for immediate and delayed items
in Ward et al. (2013), Experiment 1. Left panel: discriminability
performance (d′) [significant main effect of age group, F(1, 38) = 4.26,
p = 0.04, η2p = 0.10, and delay, F(1, 38) = 5.76, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.13, and no
significant interaction, F(1, 38) = 0.16, p = 0.69]. Right panel: proportion of
hit and false-alarm responses. Bars indicate experimental data (error bars
indicate SE of the mean), and symbols indicate the mean expected result
from each model when fit to each individual’s data. I, immediate; D,
delayed; SS, single-system model; MS1, multiple-systems-1 model; MS2,
multiple-systems-2 model.
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FIGURE 2 | Continuous identification (CID) task performance in Ward
et al. (2013), Experiment 1. Left panel: priming effects [no significant main
effect of age group, F(1, 38) = 1.78, p = 0.19, or delay, F(1, 38) = 0.02,
p = 0.89, and no significant interaction, F(1, 38) = 0.04, p = 0.85]. The
proportional priming effect was calculated as the difference in the median
identification RT to new and old items divided by the median identification RT
for new items. Bars indicate the mean of the median priming across
participants (error bars indicate SE of the mean), and symbols indicate the
mean expected proportional priming (relative to the expected identification
RT for new items, see Table 3) from each model when fit to each individual’s
data. Right panel: mean identification RTs (ms) of immediate, delayed, and
new items. Bars indicate experimental data (error bars indicate SE of the
mean), and symbols indicate the mean expected result from each model
when fit to each individual’s data. Imm, immediate; Delay, delayed; SS,
single-system model; MS1, multiple-systems-1 model; MS2,
multiple-systems-2 model.
but there was no significant main effect of age or delay (though
as noted above, when Ward et al. pooled data from this and
two other similar experiments, the age effect on priming reached
significance).
The models were fit to the data using maximum likelihood
estimation. An outline is given here; full details of the general
fitting procedure can be found in Berry et al. (2012). An auto-
mated procedure was used to find the values of the parameters
that maximized the summed log likelihood across trials, for each
participant. Certain parameter values were fixed (as in Berry
et al., 2012): the mean f of new items was fixed to zero (i.e.,
μnew = 0 in the SS model, and μr|new = μp|new = 0 in the MS1
and MS2 models), the mean of ep and er were also fixed to
zero, and the standard deviation of f for old and new items was
fixed to equal the standard deviation of the noise associated with
recognition, that is, σf = σr =
√
0.5 (and so σ2Jr = σ2f + σ2r = 1).
Finally, the value of s in the MS1 and MS2 models was fixed to
that of the SS model. There are six free parameters in the SS
model: μimmediate, the mean f of the immediate item distribu-
tion; μdelayed, the mean f of the delayed item distribution; C, the
“old” judgment criterion; b, the identification RT intercept; s the
rate of change in RT with changes in f ; and σp, the variance of
ep, the noise associated with the priming task. The MS1 model
has seven free parameters: μr|immediate, the mean explicit mem-
ory strength of the immediate item distribution; μp|immediate, the
mean implicit memory strength of the immediate item distribu-
tion; μr|delayed, the mean explicit memory strength of the delayed
item distribution; μp|delayed, the mean implicit memory strength
of the immediate item distribution; C, the “old” judgment cri-
terion; b, the identification RT intercept; and σp, the variance of
ep. TheMS2model has eight free parameters: like theMS1model,
μr|immediate,μp|immediate,μr|delayed,μp|delayed, b,C, and σp are free,
but additionally, w, the correlation between fr and fp, is a free
parameter.
The likelihood of each identification RT (RT) and recognition
judgment Z on a given trial is given as follows:
L (Z,RT|I) =
[

(
Cj
∣∣∣μJr|RT,I, σ2Jr|RT
)
−
(
Cj− 1
∣∣∣μJr|RT,I, σ2Jr|RT
)]
× φ(RT| b − sμp|I, σ2RT) (3)
where I is the item type and I = new, immediate, delayed; is the
cumulative normal distribution function; φ is the normal density
function; and σ2RT = s2σ2f + σ2p. j = 1 when Z = “new,” and j = 2
when Z = “old”; C0 = −∞, C1 = C and C2 = ∞. μJr|RT,I and
σ2Jr|RT are the mean and variance of the conditional distribution
of Jr given RT, calculated as
μJr|RT,I = μr|I −
wsσ2f
(
RT − b + sμp|I
)
s2σ2f + σ2p
(4)
and
σ2Jr|RT = σ2f + σ2r −
w2s2σ4f
s2σ2f + σ2p
(5)
whereμr|new = 0 when I = new,μr|immediate ≥ 0 when I = imme-
diate, and μr|delayed ≥ 0 when I = delayed; μp|new = 0 when I
= new, μp|immediate ≥ 0 when I = immediate, and μp|delayed ≥
0 when I = delayed. In the SS model, μr|new = μp|new = 0,
μr|immediate = μp|immediate, μr|delayed = μp|delayed, and w = 1. In
the MS1 model w = 0. In the MS2 model 0 ≤ w ≤ 1.
Given the best fitting parameter values for a model, the
expected model results can be calculated analytically (see
Table 1).
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In the SS, MS1, and MS2 models, the expected values of RT
conditional on judgment Z are given by the following:
E [RT|Z, I] = b − sμp|I +
swσ2f
σJr
φ
(
Cj−μr|I
σJr
)
− φ
(
Cj− 1−μr|I
σJr
)

(
Cj−μr|I
σJr
)
− 
(
Cj−1−μr|I
σJr
)
(6)
where σJr =
√
σ2f + σ2r . j = 1 when Z = N, and j = 2 when Z =
O; C0 = −∞, C1 = C and C2 = ∞.
Thus, Equation 6 gives the expected RT of hits for immediate
items when I = immediate and Z = O; it gives the expected RT
of hits for delayed items when I = delayed and Z = O; it gives the
expected RT of false alarms when I = new and Z = O. Similarly,
Equation 6 gives the expected RT of misses for immediate items
when I = immediate and Z = N; it gives the expected RT of
misses for delayed items when I = delayed and Z = N; and gives
the expected RT of correct rejections when I = new and Z = N.
Table 1 | Expected values for measures of recognition and priming in
the models.
Measure Model expected value
P(Hit|immediate) 1—(C—μr|immediate)
P(Hit|delayed) 1—(C—μr|delayed)
P(False Alarm) 1—(C)
d ′Immediate μr|immediate
d ′Delayed μr|delayed
E[RT|new] b
E[RT|immediate] b—sμp|immediate
E[RT|delayed] b—sμp|delayed
Proportional priming measure
(immediate items)
sμp|immediate/b
Proportional priming measure (delayed
items)
sμp|delayed/b
Themaximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are given
in Table 2, and the goodness of fit of the models is given in
Table 3. Unsurprisingly, the greater flexibility of the MS2 model
allows it to provide the best fit to the data, as indicated by the
smallest ln(L) values. However, the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC, Akaike, 1973) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC,
Schwarz, 1978) model evidence measures, which penalize mod-
els with more free parameters and which in the case of the BIC
also take into account the number of data points being fit, clearly
favored the SS model over the MS1 and MS2 models, as indicated
by the lower AIC and BIC values (Burnham and Anderson, 1998).
Figure 3 shows the proportion of participants that were best fit by
each of the models. It is clear that the SSmodel was the best fitting
model by the AIC and BIC measures for the vast majority of par-
ticipants; a small minority were best fit by the MS1 model. None
were best fit by the MS2 model.
The expected model results are presented in Figures 1, 2, 4.
All models reproduced the trend for recognition memory to be
greater for immediate than for delayed items. These effects all
arise because μr is larger for young than for old participants and
for immediate vs. delayed items, as shown in the top 2 rows of
Table 2. The models all also predicted that priming in the young
adult group would be greater than that in the older adult group
(Figures 1, 2). With regards to the expected proportional priming
effects (Figure 2; calculated as specified in Table 1), the SS model
results mirror those of the recognition data: that is, priming in the
older group is lower than that of the young group, and priming
for immediate items is greater than that of delayed items. Under
the MS1 and MS2 models, priming was lower in the older group
than the young group for both immediate and delayed items.
Furthermore, in the older group, the expected priming effect for
delayed items was less than for immediate items; however, in the
young group, the expected priming for delayed items was greater
than for immediate items.
The results concerning the specific predictions of the models
are shown in Figure 4. In both groups, in line with the advance
predictions of the SS model, there were trends for items judged
old to have shorter identification RTs than items judged new (i.e.,
Table 2 | Mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the parameter estimates of the models (derived by maximum likelihood estimation).
Parameter SS MS1 MS2
Young Older Young Older Young Older
μr|immediate 1.50 (0.76) 1.10 (0.45) 1.52 (0.75) 1.08 (0.48) 1.52 (0.75) 1.09 (0.48)
μr|delayed 1.31 (0.73) 0.95 (0.50) 1.29 (0.74) 0.93 (0.50) 1.29 (0.74) 0.93 (0.50)
μp|immediate = μr|immediate = μr|immediate 1.23 (1.05) 1.16 (0.62) 1.22 (1.22) 1.14 (0.65)
μp|delayed = μr|delayed = μr|delayed 1.96 (1.42) 1.34 (0.76) 1.96 (1.96) 1.41 (0.72)
w = 1 = 1 = 0.00 = 0.00 0.56 (0.42) 0.56 (0.41)
C 0.79 (0.64) 0.77 (0.43) 0.79 (0.64) 0.76 (0.43) 0.79 (0.64) 0.76 (0.43)
b 1470 (442) 2189 (635) 1480 (461) 2210 (636) 1480 (461) 2210 (636)
s 140 (100) 199 (166) = SS = SS = SS = SS
σp 630 (197) 936 (315) 626 (193) 932 (313) 625 (193) 931 (312)
A value preceded by an equal sign indicates that the value was fixed. The parameters σf and σr are not shown, but in all models their value was fixed to σf = σr =
1/
√
2.
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Table 3 | Goodness of fit of the models.
SS MS1 MS2
p ln(L) AIC BIC p ln(L) AIC BIC p ln(L) AIC BIC
Young (n = 20) 6 −19332.1 38904.2 39593.9 7 −19330.4 38940.7 39745.3 8 −19317.1 38954.2 39873.7
Older (n = 20) 6 −18612.9 37465.7 38144.6 7 −18611.1 37502.1 38294.2 8 −18604.2 37528.4 38433.6
AIC stands for the Akaike (1973) Information Criterion, calculated as AIC = −2ln(L) + 2P, where P = p × n is the total number of free parameters for each fit, where p
is the number of free parameters for each model, and n is the number of participants modeled in each experiment; BIC stands for the Bayesian Information Criterion
(Schwartz, 1978), calculated as BIC = −2ln(L) + Pln(q), where q is the number of data points fit: q Young = 2315, q Older = 2117. Bold indicates best fitting model
by the AIC or BIC.
FIGURE 3 | Model selection results. Each bar represents the percentage
of participants best fit by each model according to the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). SS,
single-system model; MS1, multiple-systems-1 model; MS2,
multiple-systems-2 model.
fluency effects, Prediction 1). This was the case within new items
[i.e., RT(FA) < RT(CR)] and also within immediate and delayed
old items [i.e., RT(H) < RT(M) for both item types], but this
was only reliable for new items in the older group, t(19) = 2.61,
p = 0.02. Similarly, in both groups, and for both immediate and
delayed items, there was a trend for the priming effect to be
greater than the priming effect for items judged new (Prediction
2; but all differences were non-significant). When the data were
collapsed across groups, however, the fluency effects within new,
immediate, and delayed items were reliable (Figure 4C): new
items, t(39) = 3.14, p = 0.003; immediate items, t(39) = 2.42, p =
0.02; delayed items, t(39) = 2.21, p = 0.03. These differences are
as predicted by the SS model, but not the MS1 model; they
were reproduced by the MS2 model. The differences in the mag-
nitude of priming overall and for items judged new were not
reliable within the collapsed data: immediate items, t(39) = 1.50,
p = 0.14; delayed items, t(39) = 1.09, p = 0.28.
In sum, the patterns of recognition and priming for young and
older adults reported in Ward et al. (2013) are largely consistent
with the single-system model, according to which any differ-
ences in performance with age are primarily consequences of a
reduction in the strength of a single underlying memory signal.
Two plausible multiple-system models fared considerably worse
when using advanced model selection techniques. In the best fits
of the MS1 and MS2 models, the mean strength of the implicit
memory signal μp was lower for the older group than the young
group (Table 2). From a multiple systems perspective, this could
suggest that aging affects both the explicit and implicit memory
systems, yet the poor performance of the MS1 model is evidence
against the idea that the memory signals driving recognition and
priming are completely independent. The qualitative results of the
more flexible MS2 model were similar to the SS model. According
to this model, there is a substantial degree of correlation between
the explicit and implicit memory strengths of an individual item.
However, the SS model was resoundingly preferred by the AIC
and BIC measures.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence presented in this article strongly draws into ques-
tion the claim that implicit memory is preserved in normal aging.
When appropriate methods and controls are used, priming is
reduced in older individuals compared to young, although the
effect is smaller than the reduction in explicit memory. Indeed,
age differences in priming rarely reach significance, but this is
likely to be due to a combination of low statistical power and
low measure reliability. The profile of memory decline in aging
suggests that there is a general impairment to a unitary memory
system. Consistent with this, we provide new evidence that the
patterns are more compatible with a formal single-system model
than feasible multiple-systems alternatives.
It is important to note that even though age effects on prim-
ing may be small and hard to detect in low-powered studies, the
single-system model emphatically predicts that such effects exist.
This can be seen in the left panel of Figure 2, where the predic-
tions of the model are shown for the Ward et al. (2013) data.
Indeed, the predictions of the SS model are strongly constrained:
whenever it predicts an age effect on recognition (reflected in
a lower value of μr for older relative to young participants, see
Table 2), it also predicts an effect on priming. It makes this pre-
diction simply because recognition and priming are based on the
same underlying signal and μr = μp. In one sense, therefore, it is
important that studies are conducted which have adequate power
to detect an effect of age on priming: the SS model could be falsi-
fied by a high-powered study which failed to detect such an effect.
But in another sense it is less important whether age effects on
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FIGURE 4 | Predictions of the SS, MS1, and MS2 models (Berry
et al., 2012) in the older group (panel A), younger group (panel B),
and collapsed across groups (panel C). “Priming: Overall - judged
new” refers to the difference in the overall priming effect and the
priming effect for items judged new. Prediction 1 concerns whether
fluency effects occur within new and old items (i.e., CR − FA and
M − H). Prediction 2 concerns whether the magnitude of the priming
effect overall (across all items) is greater than the priming effect for
items judged new. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. I,
immediate; D, delayed; CR, correct rejection, FA, false alarm; M, miss;
H, hit; SS, single-system model; MS1, multiple-systems-1 model; MS2,
multiple-systems-2 model.
priming are observed or not. All the models can predict such
an effect (see Figure 2), and a far more discriminating test is to
determine via formal model-fitting techniques (computing AIC
and BIC, for instance) which model provides the best fit to the
data. Put differently, little will be gained in our view from further
studies asking whether age effects on priming reach the rather
arbitrary cliff-edge criterion of p < 0.05. Instead, more will be
learned from taking the underlying quantitative data and asking
which theoretical model provides the best fit.
The results are consistent with previous applications of the
single-system model to data from individuals with amnesia. For
example, Conroy et al. (2005) reported intact priming on a
word CID task in individuals with amnesia due to damage to
the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe despite substantial
impairment to recognition memory. This type of dissociation
has been taken as strong evidence for multiple-systems views.
The SS model was able to closely fit this pattern (Berry et al.,
2012) but, like the present study, the model predicted a small
deficit in priming in amnesia. Although controversial, this is con-
sistent with proposals that, when carefully examined, priming
is not completely preserved in amnesia (e.g., Ostergaard, 1999).
Another commonly cited strand of evidence for multiple sys-
tems is that manipulations tend to produce different effects on
tests of recognition and priming in healthy young individuals.
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For example, Butler and Klein (2009) showed that manipulat-
ing attention at study resulted in chance-level recognition for
ignored items, whereas priming for such items was robust (see
also Vuilleumier et al., 2005). The study by Berry et al. (2010)
did not replicate this pattern: when recognition was at chance,
priming was also absent. Moreover, the data patterns were again
consistent with the predictions of the single-system model.
Lastly, the multiple-systems account argues that an implicit
memory system is resistant to age-related decline, but in order
to make this claim in the future one must provide evidence of
completely equivalent priming in young and older individuals, or
demonstrate conditions in which priming is greater in older rel-
ative to young adults, while at the same time explicit memory is
weaker. This kind of double dissociation would present a chal-
lenge to the single system model, as the pattern would not occur
if performance on explicit and implicit tasks is driven by a single
memory signal. We hope that this discussion will lead to further
useful developments in this longstanding debate.
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